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Abstract
It is frequently claimed that breeding animals that we know will have unavoidable health problems is at least prima facie wrong, because
it harms the animals concerned. However, if we take ‘harm’ to mean ‘makes worse off’, this claim appears false. Breeding an animal
that will have unavoidable health problems does not make any particular individual animal worse off, since an animal bred without such
problems would be a different individual animal. Yet, the intuition that there is something ethically wrong about breeding animals — such
as purebred pedigree dogs — in ways that seem negatively to affect welfare remains powerful. In this paper, an animal version of what
is sometimes called the non-identity problem is explored, along with a number of possible ways of understanding what might be wrong
with such breeding practices, if it is not that they harm the animal itself. These possibilities include harms to others, placeholder
arguments, non-comparative ideas of harm, an ‘impersonal’ approach, and concerns about human attitudes and dispositions. 
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Introduction
Discussion of ethical questions raised by animal breeding
has become increasingly significant, both in popular and in
scientific discourse. For example, a recent guest editorial in
the Journal of Veterinary Behavior begins: 
Is it acceptable to deliberately breed dogs that will have
trouble running without shortness of breath, or whose
likelihood of inheriting diabetes is 10 times higher than
that of the general canine population? (Rooney 2009;
p 180). 
This question echoes widespread concerns that particular
ways of breeding companion animals — ones that appear to
impact on the animals’ welfare — are ethically question-
able; that, for instance, “pedigree dog breeding puts
pedigree dogs at increased risk of ill health and thus reduces
their welfare” (Advocates for Animals 2006); and that for
this reason “changes in breeding and selection practices are
urgently required” (Rooney 2009; p 186). Breeding animals
in ways that seem to negatively affect welfare is not only
confined to companion animals; it applies to laboratory
animals, too. Mice (Mus musculus), in particular, are bred
for experimental purposes, to develop tumours and other
diseases that model the progress of similar pathologies in
human beings. It is plausible to think that breeding mice in
these ways at least prima facie harms the mice concerned,
even if we conclude that, all things considered, the benefits
ethically justify such practices. 
In this paper, however, a philosophical problem (sometimes
called the non-identity problem) will be explored. This
problem appears to undermine the claim, in most cases at
least, that breeding animals in these ways harms the animals
concerned. The non-identity problem has been much
explored in certain human cases, but so far been little
applied to animal cases (though see Rollin 2003; Benatar
[passim] 2006; Sandøe & Christiansen 2008; Streiffer
2008). I will begin by explaining why the non-identity
problem is a problem in the human context, and make some
adjustments in order to accommodate animal breeding.
Then, three animal cases will be considered — the English
bulldog, the transgenic mouse, and the short-lived
dog — all of which, will be claimed, present something like
a non-identity problem. In all these cases, most people intu-
itively think that something is wrong, but on closer exami-
nation, it is difficult to locate where that wrongness might
lie. Drawing on related debates about whether creating
people can harm them, several arguments will be outlined
that might explain this apparent wrongness in animal cases.
However, it will be suggested, these arguments work better
to explain some animal breeding problems than others;
certain cases are more resistant to resolution, or present the
problem that any resolution appears to generate ethical
difficulties for different reasons. 
Given the well-known intractability of the non-identity
problem, the purpose of this paper is not to maintain that it
can be resolved in animal cases. Nor, importantly, am I
suggesting that it is normally morally acceptable to breed
unhealthy animals — especially companion
animals — when we could breed healthier ones. I share the
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widely held intuition to the contrary. But, nonetheless, there
is value in investigating the difficult challenges to this
intuition, and in trying to work out how far, and in what
ways, it can be defended.
The non-identity problem
The non-identity problem arises from the fact that there are
some actions, and policies, that affect who actually comes
into existence. Most obviously, this applies to direct
decisions about reproduction. Choosing to get pregnant in
September rather than October will mean that a different
egg is fertilised by a different sperm. So, a child conceived
in September is non-identical with a child that could alter-
natively have been conceived in October. As Parfit (1984)
argues, a surprising number of our choices — not just
directly reproductive ones — affect the identities of future
individuals. So, adopting a particular energy and transport
policy will lead to different individual people coming into
existence than if an alternative energy policy had been
adopted. Parfit (1984; p 361) comments “How many of us
could truly claim ‘Even if railways and motor cars had
never been invented, I would still have been born?’”
This results in a problem because of the way we conceptualise
harms. Harman (2009; p 137) captures this in a helpful way:
The non-identity problem arises because some actions
appear to be wrong, and they appear to be wrong in
virtue of harming certain people, but those people
would not have existed if the actions had not been per-
formed, and those people have lives that are worth liv-
ing. Such actions are puzzling because they do not
make these people worse off than they otherwise would
have been; but plausibly, one harms someone only if
one makes her worse off. 
Non-identity problems, then, arise in situations where intu-
itively it seems as though some wrong has been committed,
but where no particular person appears to have been
harmed, because, had some other action or policy been
pursued, a different individual or individuals would have
existed. It is helpful here to have a concrete example in
mind. Here is a version of one of the much-discussed human
cases, which I have called the ‘Hasty Mother’ case; this
parallels, fairly closely, the kinds of non-identity animal
breeding cases I will be considering. 
Hasty Mother case
Suppose a woman wants a child. She knows that if she
conceives now, owing to a short-lived disease she currently
has, there is a high risk that the child will have significant
and incurable disabilities, though the child will still have a
life worth living. However, if she waits three months to try
to conceive, this risk will be over and she could expect to
have a healthy child. But this woman decides to conceive
now. She has a child, as expected, with significant and
incurable disabilities, though the child has a life worth
living. But this child has not been harmed, because had the
woman waited three months, she would have had a different
healthy child (a different egg would have fused with a
different sperm). Since the child she gives birth to has a life
worth living, and it is not possible for “this particular indi-
vidual to exist and not suffer an impairment” (Roberts 2009;
p 203) then no-one has been harmed. Yet most people intu-
itively think that the woman should have waited, and that it
was wrong of her not to do so. (NB This is similar to a case
discussed in Parfit [1984]).
To make what is going on in this case clear, it is important to
clarify two terms: a ‘life worth living’ (or ‘not worth living’)
and ‘harm’. I take a ‘life worth living’ to be a life in which
the intrinsically good states outweigh the intrinsically bad
states, and a life not worth living to be the reverse — a life
in which the intrinsically bad states outweigh the intrinsi-
cally good states, if there are any (see McMahan 2009; p 49).
(NB As a reviewer for this paper commented, the term a ‘life
not worth living’ could refer to a life of zero value, as well
as one of negative value; it would be better to use the term
‘life worth not living’ to exclude the zero value life.
However, the literature in this field, including Parfit (1984),
standardly uses “life not worth living”, so while I think this
point is correct, common usage has been adopted). ‘Harm’
can be taken here in two senses (and what is significant is
that the child with disabilities born in the Hasty Mother case
does not seem to have been harmed in either of them). One
sense of harm is narrow and non-comparative (though
controversial): to create a being to have a life not worth
living. The child in the Hasty Mother case has not been
harmed in this way; it is stipulated that he has a life worth
living. The second sense of harm is a standard, comparative
sense, one that includes a counterfactual condition. Someone
is harmed if they have been made worse off than they
otherwise would have been. The child in this case has not
been harmed in this sense, either, since a child born without
these disabilities would have been a different child. I will
accept both these senses of harm here (there is some
disagreement about the first, but to reject it would not
change, but rather deepen, the problem) (Heyd 1992).
The ‘Hasty Mother’ case provides a model for animal cases
that have, in some respects, a similar form; cases where,
intuitively, it seems as though some wrong has occurred, but
where there has been no person-affecting (or, since animals
are under discussion, let us say ‘individual-affecting’) harm
(both de Grazia [2005] and McMahan [2009] make this
terminological adjustment). I should note here that I am just
going to assume that animals can be harmed (they can be in
negative experiential states of pain, discomfort etc) and that
this matters ethically. In saying this, I do not mean to pre-
judge the question whether practices such as animal
research are morally wrong overall. Human benefits may
outweigh any harms to animals. But we can judge that an
action is prima facie objectionable without thereby
concluding that it is, all things considered, wrong. What I
am interested in here is whether an action at least stands in
need of some justification. This does not mean that it cannot
be justified (Hanser 1990). 
Breeding animal cases
Animal breeding brings billions of animals into existence
each year. Many of these animals are bred in specific ways
to meet specific human purposes. I will call such breeding
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practices ‘identity-affecting’, using Lillehammer’s (2009;
p 232) definition of identity-affecting: “A choice is identity-
affecting if it determines which among some set of possible
items will actually come to exist”. To clarify: I am using
‘identity’ here in what is sometimes called a numerical
rather than a qualitative sense. Where objects or individuals
share properties, they have some degree of qualitative
identity. So, for instance, a Siamese and a Russian Blue cat
share certain properties that come with being cats, and thus
have a degree of qualitative identity — though this is not as
great as the qualitative identity that would be shared by two
Siamese cats. Numerical identity, on the other hand,
“requires absolute qualitative identity and can only hold
between a thing and itself”. (Noonan 2009; p 1) So,
although two Siamese cats may share a high degree of qual-
itative identity, they are numerically distinct. They are
different individual cats. When animals are deliberately
bred using selected mates or gametes, individuals with
different numerical identities are created than would exist if
the animals were left to choose their own mates, or if
different mates or gametes were selected. It is in this
numerical sense, then, that animal breeding is identity-
affecting. I will focus in this paper on two specific cases of
this kind: breeding a pedigree bulldog, and breeding a trans-
genic mouse that is created to develop cancer.
English bulldog1
This bulldog has been bred in a line of champions. The sire
and dam were carefully selected for their bloodline. The
bulldog was a healthy puppy. However, she has a very high
likelihood of developing hip dysplasia, cysts, dermatitis and
cherry eye, may suffer respiratory distress and is very
vulnerable to heat stress. If used for breeding, she is likely
to need a Caesarean section, as the heads of purebred
bulldogs may be too big to emerge without surgery. Studies
suggest that she will live between 4.6 and 6.7 years, at least
several years fewer than an average mixed breed dog
(Patronek et al 1997; Mitchell 1999; UK Kennel Club
2004). But she will have a human home where she is fed,
exercised, cared about and receives prompt veterinary
treatment when required.
Transgenic mouse
This mouse has been produced from a complex range of
technologies, including the development of transgenic mice
that can carry cloned genes integrated into the mouse
genome; the ability to clone oncogenes causally implicated
in natural cancers, that form cancers when transplanted into
host animals; the bringing together of these two technologies
to produce mice with heritable predispositions to particular
cancers; and/or gene knockout technology to produce mice
lacking in tumour suppressor gene function (see Hanahan
et al 2007). A mouse produced using this technology is
extremely likely, heritably, to develop some form of cancer.
It carries specific genes, ones that will essentially shape the
kind of life lived. It is born in a laboratory, lives in a labora-
tory, has access to adequate amounts of food and water, and
is housed in a stable group with other familiar mice. When
the painful cancer develops, injections of an experimental
drug are given, that, it is hoped, will improve or cure the
condition. After several weeks of this therapy the mouse will
be killed in order to examine the tumours. 
Humans are responsible for the existence of the pedigree
bulldog and transgenic mouse. In both cases, the way the
animals have been created has welfare impacts. The bulldog
will, very predictably, live a shorter and much less healthy
life than another dog that the breeder could have
bred — perhaps even a dog with one of the same parents. The
transgenic mouse will, predictably, develop painful tumours;
other mice could have been bred that had much healthier
lives. But let us assume what is certainly possible: that both
animals have a life worth living; the intrinsically bad states in
their lives do not outweigh the good ones. They will be
adequately cared for, or in the case of the bulldog, well cared
for, throughout their lives. They have enough to eat, sufficient
social contact of the right kind, enough space, and medical
treatment when they need it. They do not suffer welfare
problems because of the ways that they are looked after; and
they are not killed when their lives are still well worth living.
We could even suppose that the bulldog has the best well-
being that is possible for her. Still, the animals will have
welfare problems, problems that are built into the very fabric
of their being, even if their lives go as well as they possibly
could. And it’s this that makes these cases so difficult2. 
Take the English bulldog: it is often argued that the deliberate
breeding of unhealthy, purebred dogs is ethically wrong. This
conviction has had significant effects on the world of
pureblood dog breeding. It led the BBC to refuse to broadcast
the Crufts Dog Show — an annual institution in the UK — in
2009. And it prompted a spokesperson for the Royal Society
for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals to comment:
“Breeding deformed and disabled animals is morally unjusti-
fiable and has to stop”. (see Mark Evans’ comments as
reported in The Times, September 6th 2008, available at
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article4761471.ec
e). But the problem here lies in identifying where the moral
wrong is supposed to be. This particular bulldog, and other
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1 English bulldogs are mentioned in passing in this context by
Sandøe and Christensen (2008; p 144). 
2 Perhaps some kind of gene therapy or other medical intervention
could limit the effects of these conditions after conception, and
make these particular animals better off. But then the problem
would still persist (albeit with diminished intensity) unless they
were cured. But if they were cured, we would not be likely to think
they had been harmed, so there would be no sense of a problem.
As I will point out later, given that these animals are deliberately
produced to have the features that are welfare-affecting, it seems
highly implausible that such interventions would be pursued in any
case, even if the technology to do so existed.
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purebreds like her, have not been harmed, in the sense of
being made worse off; she would not have existed had
another dog — say, a healthier, longer-lived mixed breed
dog — been bred in her place. So, while it intuitively seems
wrong to breed an unhealthy purebred dog, when another
healthy dog could have been bred in its place, that wrong
does not appear to be, as we might initially think, ‘individual-
affecting’. The situation is similar with the transgenic mouse.
The transgenic mouse will have poor welfare through the
later part of its life when it develops painful tumours. But,
since it would not have been bred but for the prospect that it
would develop these tumours, we cannot say that it has been
harmed — that is, made worse off — because of its predispo-
sition to cancer. Either the mouse is created with this predis-
position to cancer, or it would not exist at all. 
In both cases, something at least worth moral debate seems
to have occurred, even if there is disagreement about
whether, all things considered, these actions are wrong. Yet,
in neither of these cases, at first sight, does it seem as
though an actual, existing individual has been harmed. If
what is morally wrong must involve harms to particular
individuals, then there seems to be nothing wrong at all.
This, though, has troubling implications, opening up possi-
bilities such as the following. 
Short-lived dogs
The phenomenon of children pestering their parents for a
pet, then quickly tiring of it and leaving their parents to care
for it, is well known. A canny dog breeder spots a gap in the
market. She begins to breed dogs with very short lives.
After about two years, these dogs develop an untreatable
disease, and they die in a couple of weeks. The breeder
markets the dogs to parents of children with short attention
spans. The dogs become popular, since parents know that
after the child tires of the dog, they will not have another ten
or more years of dog care ahead of them. Since these
parents do not want long-term commitment to a dog,
without the option of a short-lived dog, they would not
agree to have a dog at all.
It is worth noting that this is not, strictly, a non-identity
case. Although it is not physically impossible that other,
longer-lived dogs could instead be bred, the short-lived
dogs are specifically produced to fulfill a demand that only
they can satisfy. In practice, either the short-lived dogs are
bred, or no dogs are bred at all, since if there were no short-
lived dogs, this particular source of demand for dogs would
just disappear, rather than switch to demand for other
longer-lived dogs. But, despite this, the short-lived dogs
raise a similar problem to the non-identity cases. Since these
dogs would not have existed otherwise, overall they have
lives worth living, and none of them is made worse off by
this arrangement, the practice of breeding them seems
ethically permissible. But no doubt, many would respond
that it is ethically outrageous. 
This highlights the more general worry here. If wrongs to
animals must be individual-affecting, then some existing
ethical debates about animals just seem misplaced. For, if
the focus is on harm to individuals, we have identified no
ethical problem at all. No individual animal has been
harmed in these cases, at least in the sense of having been
made worse off than it would otherwise have been. But can
there really not be even a prima facie objection to any of
these practices? This seems so counter-intuitive that it is
surely worth further investigation.
One possible response here is simply to bite the bullet and
say that there is nothing ethically problematic about these
cases, not just ‘all things considered’, but in any sense at all.
It might be claimed that our intuitions, primed for ethical
questions raised by beings already in existence, work poorly
in cases of bringing into being. If all wrongs are individual-
affecting harms, harm means being made worse off, and no
individual has been made worse off, then intuitions that
there are at least ethical problems worth discussing here
must be mistaken. As long as these animals have a life
worth living — even the short-lived dogs — then there is
nothing wrong with creating them this way. Some of those
working on the non-identity problem in human cases have
accepted this position, at least with respect to these cases
where the being concerned cannot both exist and be better
off, such as the incurably disabled child in the Hasty Mother
case. However, this answer is unsatisfactory and strongly
counter-intuitive. It seems to entail that we can breed
animals in whatever way we want, without there being any
ethical problems, provided that the animals we breed can be
expected to have a life that is even marginally worth living. 
Alternatives to ‘nothing’s wrong!’ 
What alternatives are there to the ‘nothing’s wrong!’ conclu-
sion? A number of responses have been suggested in human
non-identity cases. It is useful to think these through in
animal breeding cases, since they help to reveal both the
intractability of the problem, and some useful directions for
further exploration:
• Someone, but not the one created, is harmed;
• Placeholder arguments that shift the sense of identity at
stake; 
• A non-comparative, or differently comparative, idea of
harm;
• Going ‘impersonal; and
• A problem of human attitude.
Harms to others
Roberts (2009) argues that in human cases such as the Hasty
Mother case, it is rare for no harm to be done to anyone else.
So, in the Hasty Mother case, although the child with
disabilities is not harmed, the creation of the child will
likely have negative distributive effects on others. For
instance, existing siblings may be made worse off by the
additional cost and time that the child with disabilities
causes their parents. Or, society in general may carry a
higher burden of expense, so all individuals are made
somewhat worse-off.
But, of course, this argument is contingent, even in the
human case: the child may be an only child, or the benefits
the sibling with disabilities brings may, in fact, outweigh the
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costs, if there are any, to the other siblings. Even if there are
some human cases where this argument would work, it is
difficult to imagine that there are many such animal cases. It
is possible that in creating a purebred dog that is unhealthy,
meeting the veterinarian’s bills could make others (human
and non-human) economically worse off. But, more
commonly, animals are bred directly to benefit people (as
with the transgenic mice and the short-lived dogs), and
(normally) unlike children. So, costs in this sense will rarely
be a problem. Roberts (2009) suggests that in human cases
where no-one (either the one created or the ones impacted)
is harmed, then there just is nothing wrong. In particular, the
Hasty Mother case poses no moral concerns. She merely
thinks these cases are unusual. But, if we include animal
cases (and far more animals are bred than humans created
every year) then these cases are, in fact, extremely common.
Since in most animal cases, no other individual is
harmed — in fact they are likely benefited — this is not
going to help in explaining or justifying the sense of moral
unease about these animal breeding cases.
Placeholder arguments: shifting the sense of identity
A second attempt to defuse the non-identity problem shifts
the sense of ‘identity’ at stake, maintaining, for instance,
that individuals created from different gametes can nonethe-
less, in certain cases, fall under the same description and so
be, in this sense, identical. Suppose (to use an example of
Clark Wolf’s [2009]), a couple called John and Mitzi
stipulate in their will that their fourth child should inherit
their car. This child may not yet have been conceived, and
thus may have no particular identity; it could be male or
female, suffer from a genetic disease or otherwise, and so
on. But in terms of the inheritance, this kind of identity does
not matter. Whatever individual has the correct ‘fourth
child’ relation to John and Mitzi should get the car. Wolf
(2009), among others, argues that this is how we should
think of non-identity problems in the case of future human
generations. Suppose, for instance, that we could pursue a
policy now that both determines which individuals will
exist, and that makes them unhealthy — say, a wide-
ranging, but dirty, energy policy (see Parfit 1984). We
should, Wolf maintains, use a placeholder term, focusing on
“that class of persons [whoever they are] who will be influ-
enced by the consequences of our present actions”. This is
still ‘person-affecting’ in one sense; but the particular
identity of those born is irrelevant. 
This does not obviously resolve such non-identity
problems, though. Use of the placeholder does not change
the fact that particular actual future people have not been
harmed in a person-affecting sense; they as individuals have
not been made worse-off because of the decisions others
have taken, because had other decisions been made, they, as
individuals, would not have existed at all. But even if an
argument that uses placeholder descriptions could work in
human non-identity cases, it does not seem to work well for
the bulldog, the transgenic mouse and the short-lived dog.
The human identity-determining choices are instances
where the creation of people without the welfare-impairing
features would either be unproblematic, or welcomed
(providing that those who created them could have brought
them about while making the same choices). So, if (despite
our choice of a dirty energy policy) it turned out that future
generations did not suffer from our actions, were we able to
know of this, we would either be indifferent or pleased. In
the Hasty Mother case, were the child conceived in the risky
three-month period born without the welfare-affecting
incurable impairments, the mother would welcome it. The
mother’s concern was to have a child soon, not to have one
with impairments that produce poor welfare. But the animal
cases do not look like this. The animals are not bred with
particular welfare-affecting identities as an accidental
outcome of some other choice. It is not as if, had those
concerned waited, or made different decisions about factors
that also turn out to influence identity, animals without these
welfare-affecting features would have come into existence.
Whichever animals are bred will have the troubling
features, because that is what they are being bred for. The
bulldog nose is selected for its aesthetic qualities; the
tumour-growing mouse for its tumours — but these very
features are what is welfare-affecting. While it is true that
the purebred animals are normally bred for the features
rather than for the welfare problems that accompany the
features, the features and the welfare are inseparable. The
features cannot be had without the welfare effects, the
features are the purpose of the breeding, and everyone
knows that the welfare effects come along with the
features — presumably that is why Rooney (2009; quoted in
the Introduction) maintains that the animals are deliberately
bred to have health problems. In this case, every animal to
which a placeholder might refer would share the same
welfare-affecting features. The imaginary short-lived dogs’
case is even more direct: short-lived dogs would be bred
just because they have a feature that negatively impacts on
welfare. And those who choose to own short-lived dogs
would want them exactly the way they are; they would not
otherwise have given in to their child’s pleas for a dog. 
Given that the welfare-affecting features are the purpose of
breeding these animals, placeholder arguments that adopt a
more coarse-grained sense of identity do not work well in
these cases. The problem in animal cases is not (at least not
straightforwardly) one about different possible individuals
for which the placeholder can stand, some of whom appear
to have different welfare than others. The welfare of all the
produced individuals will be similar; that is, either the reason
for producing them or an unavoidable side-effect of it. So a
different resolution to the problem should be sought here. 
Non-comparative harm arguments
In talking about non-identity problems, I have emphasised a
counterfactual, comparative idea of harm. Someone is
harmed when they are made worse off than they otherwise
would have been. But, some philosophers, in response to the
non-identity problem, have extended the idea of non-
comparative harm beyond a ‘life not worth living’.
Suppose, they suggest, we took harm just to mean ‘in a bad
state’. There is, they argue, something wrong with putting a
Animal Welfare 2012, 21: 157-166
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sentient individual into a bad state, irrespective of what
alternative states it might have otherwise been in.
On some accounts, this kind of harm is absolutely non-
comparative. We can just call some states bad. On others,
there is a comparison, not between a particular individual
being and the alternative states it might be in, but between a
particular being and some idea of a species-norm state.
Harman (2004), an advocate of a view like this, maintains
that “one harms someone if one causes him pain, physical
or mental discomfort, disease, deformity, disability, death”.
The comparison here is not with how things would have
gone for this particular individual had the relevant action
not been performed, but with a species-normal “healthy
bodily state” (Harman 2004; p 93). Included in this healthy
bodily state is “no deformity”; it is the “normal healthy state
of an organism of the species in question”, even if this state
is never actually attainable by the particular organism in
question. On this view, breeding animals with welfare-
affecting deviations from normal healthy bodily states
harms them. So, how do these ideas of harm relate to the
bulldog, the transgenic mouse and the short-lived dog? 
First, let us consider absolutely non-comparative accounts of
harm. I have already worked with one idea of absolute non-
comparative harm: the idea of a life not worth living.
However, once a life is worth living, without being able to
compare actual states with better life states, it is not clear
what absolutely non-comparative harm could mean. If I
create you, you have a life absolutely worth living, and I
cannot compare the state you are in with alternative states
you (or others) might be in (to say, for instance, that you
have been deprived of something) it is difficult to make
sense of how I might have harmed you (Bradley 2009; p 14). 
One possible response here might be to turn to a rights view;
a rights violation could be construed as a sort of non-
comparative harm. It might be possible to violate someone’s
rights by bringing them into being in a particular way.
Boonin (2003), for instance, suggests that it’s ‘arguably
plausible’ that one has a right not to be ‘wrongfully
conceived’ if (in effect) one is conceived to have a life not
worth living, or a life that is wretched, below an acceptable
threshold. (Though he correctly notes that “it’s very unclear
who the subject of the right is, especially in cases where the
right is respected and so the potential individual is never
conceived” [Boonin 2003; p 6]). Could this explain what is
wrong in any of our cases? 
In cases where the life an animal lives is completely
miserable, though still just worth living, this rights
argument might work (though I am sceptical, like Boonin,
that rights can even apply in cases that involve bringing into
being, or that it makes sense to say that someone or some
being has rights that could not be fulfilled [Parfit 1984;
p 375]). But our three cases do not seem to fall into this
category. Take the short-lived dog, in particular. In the
human case, it is hard to see how anyone’s non-comparative
rights could be violated by (for instance) being brought into
existence and having a life worth living, while also inher-
iting a genetic disease that will kill them at the age of 30.
After all, as wags boringly note, life is itself a genetically
inherited disease from which we all will die (if something
else does not get us first). If there is a breach of rights here,
it cannot just be in creating a being whose genes destine it
to die. But if the problem is in dying so young, however,
then we have returned to a comparison with a normal
lifespan. But this is ruled out on a non-comparative view.
If rights are at stake in these animal-breeding cases, it
seems as though they must be comparative. The reason the
short-lived dogs may seem to have had their rights
violated is because most dogs live so much longer. This is
not an absolutely non-comparative view. It seems that
absolutely non-comparative views do not help in identi-
fying the wrong in creating animals such as the transgenic
mouse and the short-lived dog. 
Comparison with species’ norms accounts, such as
Harman’s, are more promising — though we immediately
run into difficulties in identifying a species-norm length of
life. The length of dogs’ lives, for instance, is tied to the size
and breed of dog, rather than to the species as a whole. But,
to approximate: let us take the average lifespan of a mixed
breed dog at, say 12 years. So we might say: if the species-
norm length of life for a dog is 12 years, to deliberately
create dogs that live less than two years, or even on average
4–7 years (like the bulldog) is to harm them. The compar-
ison is not with some longer lived particular dog one might
alternatively have created, but with the normal life for dogs.
So: if I create you, knowing that you will have a life — or
making you to have a life — that is less good or shorter than
is normal for your species, then I have harmed you.
On this view of harm, it looks as though we can give an
account of why the bulldog, the transgenic mouse and the
short-lived dog have, after all, been harmed. The bulldog
undergoes some suffering due to its pure-blood breeding; if
we norm to species rather than breed, perhaps we can say
that the bulldog has been harmed in comparison with other
dogs because of the way its breeding affects the shape of its
head. Both the short-lived dog and the transgenic mice are
caused disease, discomfort and death on account of the
features they have been created to have; so they appear to
have been seriously harmed in comparison with the ‘normal
healthy state of the species in question’. 
Significant problems exist, however, with this account.
First, there seems something strange about thinking that
whether this dog has been harmed depends on how long
other dogs live. Second, the idea of ‘species-norms’ is very
problematic, given debates about what a species actually is,
evolutionary change, and difficulties in identifying what
actually is ‘normal’ for a species. The dog case already
suggests this: there is no ‘normal’ length of life for a dog.
Third, humans currently have a (limited) ability to affect
species norms, but we can imagine this ability expanding
substantially. After all, if the market for short-lived dogs
grew, or the benefits in producing transgenic mice became
much more obvious, short-lived dogs and transgenic mice
could become the ‘norm’ for their species. On this account
of harm, if short-lived dogs became the norm, the species-
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norm harm of creating them would vanish. Yet, those who
see the creation of short-lived dogs as morally problematic
would hardly concede that a mass expansion in the market
would make the moral problem disappear. 
These differing interpretations of harm, then, do not
obviously seem to solve the problem here. Neither
non-comparative nor species-norm accounts can
establish that there is anything prima facie wrong in
the bulldog, transgenic mouse or short-lived dog
cases. But what is sometimes called ‘going imper-
sonal’ may be more promising.
Going impersonal
The most obvious alternative to all these options is to
maintain that there are ‘wrongs’ that either do not harm
anyone in particular, or that are not individual-affecting at
all. Perhaps some states of the world are worse than others
even if they are worse for no-one in particular; they are
impersonally worse, or worse in non-particular individual-
affecting ways. So, for instance, worlds with more suffering
might be worse than those with less suffering, irrespective
of who in particular is undergoing the suffering. Views of
this kind — for simplicity, I will call them ‘impersonal’
views — are usually tied to some form of ethical conse-
quentialism. (Some ‘wide person-affecting’ views that are
not impersonal could also be discussed here, but I lack the
space to do them justice. See Parfit 1984; Holtug 2010).
Given that some states of the world are (on this view) better
than others, we should aim to bring about such better states
and not to create worse states. Consequentialisms are
highly varied, in terms of what constitutes a ‘better state’,
whether the aim should be to bring about the best possible
state of the world, or a world that is, in some sense, ‘good
enough’ (to satisfice); whether to aim at maximising (or
satisficing) in terms of total or average value, and so on. I
cannot consider all these alternatives here. So I will adopt a
standard form of maximising consequentialism, where the
aim is to produce a world that is best in terms of
maximising pleasure and minimising pain; and I will try to
focus on a restricted set of questions about breeding
animals (though a commitment to ethical consequentialism
in animal breeding would — to be consistent — require one
to adopt ethical consequentialism more broadly). Going
impersonal, and adopting maximising consequentialism, to
some extent wedges apart the three cases. It provides
plausible explanations for why there might be ‘something
wrong’ in the case of the transgenic mouse and the bulldog.
But it gives us very little to go on in explaining what is
wrong with breeding short-lived dogs. This may mean that
in subtle ways these cases are not similarly problematic; or,
perhaps, that we are mistaken to think that there is a
problem with breeding short-lived dogs; or that the imper-
sonal approach cannot give us the fully satisfactory theoret-
ical explanation we are seeking.
Let us start with the transgenic tumour-prone mice. The
intuition I have been working with is that in breeding mice
to develop painful diseases, we have harmed the mice
concerned — even though the only alternative for those
particular mice is non-existence. But an impersonal framing
allows us to see this in a different way3. Humans breed mice
that (we have stipulated) have a life worth living, even
though these mice develop cancer. Since, on balance, these
mice have a life worth living, the world is a better place
because we create them. It is true that the mice suffer,
because they develop cancer. However, their suffering is
being created (let us suppose, successfully) to alleviate the
suffering of future human and animal others. So, even
though mouse suffering reduces the total good in the world,
overall the world is better with the mouse suffering than
without it. Breeding the mice improves the world both
because the mice’s lives are worth living and because their
suffering now reduces more suffering in the future — and
had we not bred them, they would not otherwise have
existed (this is assuming, of course, that creating these mice
does, over time, reduce suffering in the world — I recognise
that this is a controversial assumption).
This impersonal, consequentialist account also helps with a
related puzzle that I have so far not discussed: what Parfit
(1984; p 367) calls ‘no difference’ cases. These are cases
between which, intuitively, there seems to be no ethically
relevant difference, but where, on an individual-affecting
view, an ethical difference nonetheless emerges. So, suppose
that a scientist could either breed a group of mice with a
disposition to develop a particular cancer, or alternatively
breed healthy mice and later expose them to a mutation-
provoking drug that would give these healthy mice just as
much likelihood of developing the same cancer as those
mice bred with the disposition to develop it. There is no
difference between the welfare of the two sets of mice over
their lives (they develop the same cancer at the same age),
the experimental outcomes (let us assume) are the same, the
experimenter has the same intentions and so on. Whatever
one thinks more generally about giving mice cancer, there
appears to be no ethical difference between these two
methods of doing it. Yet, on an individual-affecting view,
breeding mice with a disposition to develop cancer does not
harm the individual mice concerned (since those mice would
not otherwise have existed) while exposing otherwise
healthy mice to a mutation-provoking drug does harm them,
since these mice could have lived healthy lives. So, on an
individual-affecting view, counter-intuitively, the cases
appear very different. The impersonal, consequentialist
approach seems to give a more plausible answer here.
The impersonal approach also offers an explanation as to
‘what is wrong’ in the case of the bulldog. The problem is
not that the bulldog itself has been harmed by the way it was
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bred. In fact, since the bulldog has a life worth living, it is
good that the bulldog was bred, and even better that it is
given the best life possible for it, by being well cared for.
However, had another, healthier dog (for instance, one with
fewer allergies and no breathing difficulties) been bred
instead, that would have been even better still. Breeding
purebred dogs with health problems, on this view, is not
unethical because there is something intrinsically wrong
about breeding dogs to be ‘deformed and disabled’. Indeed,
if these were the only kinds of dogs we could breed, we
should breed them that way, as long as their lives are not so
miserable that they are not worth living. What is unethical
about breeding the pure-blood English bulldog is that we
could breed dogs to be healthier and to lead better lives, and
thus decrease suffering and increase happiness in the world.
And if we could do this, we should. 
These impersonal responses to the transgenic mouse and the
bulldog case point us to a response in the case of the short-
lived dog — though this seems less satisfactory. Short-lived
dogs have lives that, although short, are worth living. Any
animal with a life worth living is worth producing, on this
view, provided that it does not equivalently reduce the value
of the lives with which it interacts, and a better animal could
not be produced in its place. The short-lived dog gives
pleasure to the families that own them, and the families
would not otherwise have a dog at all. If the short-lived dogs
were not bred, no other dog would be, since (as stipulated
above) the demand here is only for short-lived dogs; it is a
short-lived dog or no dog. So, on this kind of impersonal
view, one that focuses on states of pleasure and suffering,
rather than on the particular individuals that experience those
states, the breeding of short-lived dogs is not morally
troubling at all. Indeed, if there are good homes available for
these dogs, and not for other dogs, breeding such dogs may
not just be morally permissible, but morally required. So,
while the impersonal, consequentialist view allows that
there’s something ethically troubling about the transgenic
mice and the pure-blood bulldog, there’s nothing at all to
worry about in the case of the short-lived dogs. So, here, the
cases do seem to come apart. It is this conclusion that helps
us to see what matters in this kind of impersonal consequen-
tialism: it is the experiences we can create, not whose experi-
ences they are. We should breed animals, such as short-lived
dogs, in the numbers and with the well-being that would
assist in bringing about the best state of affairs in the world. 
But this conclusion creates other ethical difficulties, even
though it helps to explain what is wrong with breeding
animals that we know will have poorer welfare than others
we could have bred. In the human context, Parfit (1984), for
instance, argues that such a view leads us to what he calls
the Repugnant Conclusion: if we focus on maximising total
welfare, for any number of people with a given welfare, one
should produce more people, even though each has poorer
welfare, as long as each increases the total. So, we end up at
what he calls the ‘Z-future’, where there is an “enormous
population, each of whom has a life barely worth living”
(Parfit 1984; p 414). Transposed to the animal case, this
suggests that we should breed animals to the point where
the creation of any further animals would reduce overall
good in the world. This would likely mandate a significant
expansion in the number of domesticated animals, even if
these animals would have lives only just worth living4. In
fact, this aim may not be confined to domesticated animals,
since producing a better or best animal-inclusive world
might also imply that, as we now actively manage so many
ecosystems anyway, we should consider improving wild
animal well-being by reducing the number of carnivores
and increasing the number of herbivores, since this could
plausibly make the world better (if we can do so without
making for worse long-term consequences). 
The impersonal view outlined here, then, provides a justifi-
cation for thinking that there is a prima facie ethical
question about breeding transgenic, tumour-prone mice, just
as there is about giving healthy mice tumours, even though
if breeding mice this way were to contribute to a better
world overall, we would be right to do so. It also provides
an explanation as to why breeding unhealthy purebred dogs
is ethically troubling — because we could have bred
healthier individuals instead, thereby reducing suffering in
the world. It does not, though, give us a reason not to breed
short-lived dogs, if the alternative is to breed no dogs at all,
and the dogs have a life worth living; in fact, it appears to
provide a justification for doing so. Someone persuaded by
this impersonal approach, then, may have to bite the bullet
on the short-lived dogs, and may, in consistency, have to
accept other animal management goals that may appear
troublesome. But this approach certainly does give us a
reason why we should not breed unhealthy dogs when we
could breed others whose lives would go better. 
Yet, even for such an impersonal consequentialist, ethical
unease may still persist. One further possible way of thinking
about this is in terms of human attitude. That is: the problem
is not that short-lived dogs are harmed, nor that breeding
them necessarily makes the world worse, but that there is
something ethically troubling about the human attitudes that
lead us to breeding animals such as short-lived dogs. 
A problem of attitude
Some philosophers have argued that, in cases where no
harms can be identified, yet moral unease persists, we might
turn to ask questions about the dispositions of the human
agents involved in the troubling actions. For example, Hill
(2007) argues that in cases of environmental destruction,
where we cannot identify harmed beings, destructive acts
can raise ethical questions because of what they reveal
about the dispositions of the agents who perform them. So,
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Hill proposes: “Even if there is no convincing way to show
that the destructive acts are wrong (independently of human
and animal use and enjoyment), we may find that the will-
ingness to indulge in them reflects the absence of human
traits that we admire and regard as morally important”.
An argument of this kind could apply to some non-identity
cases. Take, for instance, the Hasty Mother. We might say of
the Hasty Mother that even though the child was not harmed,
the Hasty Mother did not show an appropriate disposition for
parenthood, a disposition that should (as Wasserman 2005
argues) be concerned primarily with a future child’s good.
The problem here turns away from the ‘harmed’ (or, rather,
not-harmed!) individual and towards the disposition or, to
use Wasserstrom’s terms, the ‘role morality’ that it is appro-
priate for a prospective parent to have.
Moving to animal cases, then: perhaps in breeding animals
in particular ways — ways that cause them to live short
lives, even if their lives are worth living, like the short-lived
dogs — we indicate the absence of (to quote Hill again)
“traits that we want to encourage, because they are, in most
cases, a natural basis for the development of certain virtues”
(Hill 2007; p 683). What negative human traits might
breeding the short-lived dogs point towards? Perhaps the
manipulation of animals to meet precise human require-
ments in this way flows from a kind of arrogant, manipula-
tive self-importance, one that “programmes [sentient]
animals with ends to suit ourselves” (Cooper 1998; p 155).
The short-lived dog case might raise questions about the
role-morality of living with a companion animal; perhaps to
demand a short-lived dog implies an unwillingness to
accept the inconvenience, the emotional commitment and
the long-term caring for another sentient being that is appro-
priate for keeping a companion animal. So, even though a
short-lived dog is not harmed, and even though there is
more positive experiential well-being in the world because
of the existence of the short-lived dog, to re-introduce Hill,
the “willingness to indulge in them (the creation of short-
lived dogs, in this case) reflects the absence of human traits
that we admire and regard as morally important”.
But, of course, someone might respond: but if creating a
short-lived dog does not harm the dog itself, and actually
adds to total positive experience in the world, why should
breeding it be seen as arrogant and manipulative, or
someone who creates such a dog as lacking in morally
admirable human traits? Perhaps breeding a short-lived dog
shows the ability to reason through one’s intuitive ethical
unease and to decide, on reflection, that it is groundless.
Given this possible response, the virtue-oriented view does
not seem to provide a conclusive explanation of why we
should not breed short-lived dogs, or other animals that
have poorer welfare than animals we might have bred.
Conclusion 
Breeding animals in apparently welfare-affecting ways has
been the subject of considerable debate, both popularly, and
in the pages of journals such as Animal Welfare. It is often
assumed in these debates that such animals have been
harmed or deprived of something; for instance, Rooney
(2009; p 183) maintains that some pedigree dogs are denied
“1, and possibly more than 1, of the 5 freedoms”. Yet,
looked at more closely, these claims are difficult to defend,
since it is hard to make a case that these animals have them-
selves been harmed or deprived of anything. I outlined
several ways of construing what ‘harming’ the animals we
breed by the way we breed them might mean, but all raised
significant problems. The best kinds of explanations appear
to be impersonal, focusing on the healthier, happier animals
we might instead have produced. Yet, such impersonal
arguments do not obviously find breeding dogs with very
short lives morally problematic, as long as those dogs have
lives that are worth living and no alternative dogs would be
bred; and they also suggest that humans have substantial
broader commitments in terms of animal breeding,
including acting in the wild. So, none of the arguments
presented here give us entirely satisfactory answers to the
ethical problems we perceive in breeding animals such as
the transgenic tumour-prone mouse, the purebred English
bulldog, and the short-lived dog. 
However, I want to conclude by emphasising that not being
able to locate a completely satisfactory theoretical explana-
tion for what is wrong in these kinds of breeding cases is not
intended to offer support for such practices. Parfit, who first
explored these questions in detail, went so far as to say that
the non-identity problem should be concealed from those
who might change policy on account of it (Parfit 1984;
p 451). In cases like these, he maintained, there is an inade-
quacy in our theoretical explanations; we should stick with
our strong intuitions that these actions and policies (such as
the actions of the Hasty Mother) are morally problematic.
While (obviously) I do not think that the non-identity
problem should be concealed, our intuitions that there is
something wrong in these breeding cases is very plausible. So
what is needed is better theoretical explanation, not a change
in practice. What the non-identity problem makes clear is that
ethical questions raised by the human capacity to create
animals should be differentiated from those raised by the
ways we treat animals that are already in existence. And, in
the light of this, more theoretical work is needed to establish
why creating animals to have poorer welfare and shorter lives
than animals we could produce is morally problematic. But
this need for more and better theory does not mean that
breeding such animals is, after all, morally acceptable.
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